A Puzzle of Poetic Expression by Gibson, John
A self, it is sometimes thought, is not so much 
a kind of thing as a kind of achievement. We 
can fail to have a self, in some relevant sense, 
much as we can fail to have a sense of humour 
or a way with words. Failure here is surely a 
matter of degree; and putting the matter this 
way indicates that the kind of self we are 
talking about is a fairly robust thing. It is not 
the “minimal” self that seems implicated in 
all conscious experience but the aspect of the 
person that articulates and gives domicile to 
identity, that it is, to a sense of self: a conception 
of how we hang together as thinking, feeling, 
and valuing beings. 
There is much disagreement about how we 
manage to build selves so conceived, but for 
roughly the past forty years a number of phi-
losophers have looked to literature for inspira-
tion. If the self is a kind of achievement, some 
of the most exciting work in the debate has 
argued that it is in effect a narrative achieve-
ment: we create a sense of self through acts of 
story-telling. The idea, perhaps reasonable, is 
that the writer’s talent for creating exemplary 
narratives – exemplary in their ability to ren-
der persons and their lives coherent and mean-
ingful – has something to show us about how 
we can do the same, though presumably with 
less artistry and aesthetic flair. Narrative, the 
idea goes, is what allows us to make available 
to ourselves and others a sense of being a kind 
of person burdened with a kind of life, and to 
be able to describe both as endowed with va-
rieties of purposiveness and significance (or as 
failing to be endowed with these things, which 
seems the preferred narrative of the nihilist 
and Galen Strawson).  
I find much to admire in the narrative ap-
proach, but I want to suggest that we look in 
a different direction for a moment, away from 
the novelist and to the poet. On the face of 
it, lyric poetry is the most manifestly self-ob-
sessed art form we possess, an artistic form 
in which the I is given tremendous freedom 
to explore itself. It is surprising and a tad ir-
responsible that philosophers who think that 
literature has much to teach us about selves 
have utterly ignored the poet. What I think 
the poet brings to our attention  is that a sense 
of self can be, and often is, generated through 
a powerful kind of expressive act and not, or not 
just, through a feat of story-telling. Or so I 
wish to suggest. 
The matter, however, gets complicated 
very quickly. An account of what poetic ex-
pression can tell us about selves obliges us to 
take seriously the idea that poetry is, in some 
sense and on certain occasions, self-expressive; so 
much is implied by the way I have set up the 
problem. Yet understanding what this means 
in properly philosophical terms is no easy af-
fair. We must supply a self for a poem’s expres-
sive handling, and finding one is where the 
trouble starts. There are three places we might 
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look for the self that is the subject of poetic 
expression, and it is worth considering each. I 
save the best for last, and on the road there we 
will gain some clarity on what we should and 
should not expect the poet to have to show us 
about persons.  
Authorial Model.
The most intuitive route to understanding 
poetic self-expression is also the one philos-
ophers are certain is doomed. It is the idea 
that poems are literally and straightforwardly 
self-expressive in the sense that they “mani-
fest” the psychological states of their authors. 
Call this the authorial model. 
In standard or paradigmatic cases, self-ex-
pression aims at transparency. This claim is 
found just about anywhere one finds con-
temporary work on self-expression literally so-
called. The flash of disapproval in the face of 
the parent whose child won’t eat his peas, the 
“I am really bored” whispered to a friend at 
lifeless party, or the terror in the eyes of one 
on whom you’ve just played a very nasty trick, 
show something about the self, revealing di-
rectly, in perfect cases, one’s state of mind.  
The idea that poets do such a thing when 
writing expressive poems is ludicrous. Even an 
apparently transparent, confessional line such 
as Robert Creeley’s “I know I only constitute 
a meager mind and voice” refuses to be taken 
as mere spiritual reportage, not because it isn’t 
true of Creeley – who knows? – but because 
the line is part of a constellation of words that 
culminate in a poem, and the poem, though 
clearly expressive and clearly about a self, is 
an artistic and aesthetic object, and so hardly 
apt for reflecting a soul as it is. A soul can be 
turned into art, and perhaps Creeley does just 
that in “Goodbye”. But if a soul isn’t also an 
artwork and an aesthetic object in its natural 
state, then we are speaking of self-expression 
now in an atypical way, and that is the point, 
since it calls on us to understand what it means 
now, in the poetic instance, since it does not 
mean what it does in standard cases.  
A poet clearly has a crucial role to play in de-
termining the expressive properties her poems 
bear. It would be madness to deny this. But the 
argument against the authorial model is that 
these properties do not become self-expressive 
because they simply function to reveal what 
the poet happens to feel inside. The creation 
of art, as R. H. Collingwood insisted, is a pro-
cess wherein an artist explores and attempts 
understand her emotions. But then the de-
fined emotion is, in a profound sense, in the 
completed work of art, brought to life there. It 
was not around for the ride and simply made 
ever more visible during the journey. If we 
encounter someone who regards a poem as a 
pure and faithful recording of the poet’s in-
ward emotions, all we would need to do to dis-
abuse him of his innocence would be to point 
out that when someone looks within, what she 
finds is never organised into stanzas, is not late 
modernist, and cannot be intelligibly seen as 
an instance of the Black Mountain Movement. 
To think otherwise has the risible consequence 
of making a poet appear to traffic in a spiritual 
version of readymade art. A poet’s self is just 
repurposed for the world of poetry, much as 
Duchamp repurposed a urinal for the Society 
of Independent Artists. 
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Readerly Model. 
Kendall Walton has recently shown something 
remarkable. We can be entirely literal when 
speaking of poetic self-expression, and we 
can do this by locating the relevant self not 
in the body of the poet but in the body of 
the reader. Call this the readerly model: the 
consumer of poetry supplies the self that the 
author does not and, apparently, cannot. It 
must be acknowledged that Walton’s sights are 
not quite on the issue I am exploring here. He 
wants to understand one way we come to expe-
rience a poem as self-expressive. We can grant 
that he has found this, and my concern is to 
see whether it can be enlisted in the service of 
providing a general model of the self that po-
ems make their object of expressive interest.  
Walton begins with the claim that, “it is not 
unlikely that poets sometimes have, as at least 
part of their purpose in composing a poem, the 
objective of making their words available for 
use by their readers.” A poem, the idea goes, 
expands the range of feeling and perspectives 
with which we can identify and so enlist in our 
own self-expressive projects. As Walton puts 
it in “Thoughtwriting – in Poetry and Music”, a 
poet is like a speech-writer, and speechwriters 
“don’t use the words they inscribe (not inso-
far as they are speechwriters); they mention 
them. They produce a text for use by someone 
else.” In virtue of self-identifying with a lyric, 
the reader, if you will, puts her self on loan to 
poem and thereby makes it self-expressive. A 
poem becomes genuinely and literally self-ex-
pressive when a reader says ‘you speak for me’ 
to the lyric and means it.  
This surely happens, and Walton’s is right 
to see readerly identification as part of the 
story of why we often care about a poem’s ex-
pressive activity. But there are certain limita-
tions to this theory. In part of us it conjures 
up an image of that awkward moment at wed-
dings everywhere when the groom produces 
a poem, usually poorly chosen, and recites it 
to the bride, at which we smile politely but 
feel mild embarrassment. And one might also 
wonder how many poems will oblige when we 
use them to declare our own thoughts and 
feelings. Surely with most poems the best we 
can do is borrow a few lines, cherry-picked 
to match our self-expressive goals. Given the 
facts of my personhood such as they are, am 
I genuinely capable of such an act of self-iden-
tification with a poem such as Sylvia Plath’s 
“Metaphors” or Paul Celan’s “Death Fugue”, 
the first evidently about one’s pregnant body 
and the second, though supremely enigmatic, 
the expressive act of one who has to speak on 
behalf of an experience I surely cannot: the 
Shoah. Only self-deception and self-flattery 
would allow me to claim the I’s of those lyrics 
and think I mean it, that the identification we 
are all surely capable should be seen as a form 
of self-identification. Now a defender of the 
readerly model will respond that I should just 
choose better poems, namely ones with which 
I actually can expressively self-identify. But my 
point suffices to reveal the worry one should 
have about linking poetic self-expression so 
directly to the reader, for it renders the set of 
poems I can experience as self-expressive likely 
absurdly small.  
Note also that a tremendous array of emo-
tions we experience in the context of poetry 
are other-directed emotions, and the vast me-
ness of a readerly model will not be able to 
accommodate this. Other-directed emotions 
are the kinds of emotions we have toward per-
sons when their plights move us. Empathy and 
sympathy are presumably at times appropri-
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ate affective responses to a poem, as are care, 
concern, compassion, pity, and, at times, even 
contempt (such as when I read Charles Bukow-
ski). All these emotions require clear self-other 
differentiation. In the case of poetry, the ob-
ject of these emotions would presumably be 
the self given expression in the poem. And 
while we do not yet know what that self is, 
is simply cannot be my self. Consider. I feel a 
sense of awe at the manner in which in Louise 
Glück’s “The Wild Iris” makes a cycle of plant 
life an object of intense affective concern. In 
the poem, an iris returns from the “oblivion” 
of winter to find, presumably on a fine Spring 
day, that  
from the center of my life came 
a great fountain, deep blue 
shadows on azure seawater.  
On the readerly model, it would seem that if 
I feel awe in this poem’s accomplishment of 
self-expression, then it must be myself that I 
find awesome, the narcissism of which is im-
ponderable. Too bad for the blossoming iris, 
who does so much to make herself the object 
of regard.  
Lyrical model. 
One will have noticed that neither the autho-
rial nor readerly model has much to say about 
what poetry might show us about what selves 
are and how we get them. They are both realist 
and literalist models of self-expression: poetry 
expresses the feelings of an actual self in a way 
that is continuous with our workaday attempts 
to enlist language to express our psychological 
states. This might tell us how a self feels, but it 
appears to reveal precisely nothing about what 
a self is. I suggest, then, abandoning literalism 
here. The concept of poetic self-expression 
does not call on us to find an actual self. And 
we also accept that in the context of poetry, 
self-expression means something quite other 
than it does in standard or ordinary contexts. 
Call this a lyrical model, the basic claim of 
which is that the self implicated in a poem is 
an effect of poetic language, and it exists sole-
ly there, created by and confined to a poem’s 
lyrical activity.  
The idea is this. By engaging with the content 
of a poem imaginatively, we come to hear it as 
voiced, that is, as presented by a speaker whose 
existence we merely have to entertain. In vir-
tue of this, and contrary to Walton, we hear 
the words that animate the voice as used and 
not merely mentioned. And this becomes in-
teresting not because we can say that in poetry 
we find an imagined speaker expressing her 
fictional mental states. This is not interesting 
at all. We mean something very different than 
the literalist does when we speak of a certain 
class of self-expressive acts, the poetic includ-
ed. This is the class that has as its goal not 
expressing how one feel  inside but revealing 
a much more fundamental feature of person-
hood.  
An example would help here. Consider 
George Oppen’s “From Disaster” (1962)  
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Ultimately the air 
Is bare sunlight where must be found 
The lyric valuable. From disaster 
Shipwreck, whole families crawled 
To the tenements, and there 
Survived by what morality 
Of hope 
Which for the sons 
Ends its metaphysic 
In small lawns of home. 
Oppen began his poetic career in the 1930s 
as an Objectivist, a movement of modernism’s 
second-generation that had absolutely noth-
ing to do with Ayn Rand. Objectivists insisted 
on the poem as an object rather than a confes-
sion, and on the poet as an engaged perceiver 
rather than a soul-searcher, and they intended 
this as a rebuke to writers who make the ex-
ploration of subjectivity and not the world the 
place of poet action. We see this very clearly 
in this late poem. The poem is fascinating, for 
my purposes, because it uses so few resources 
to generate such a rich and nuanced sense of 
a self. Over four stanzas that yield a mere ten 
lines, we are given an image of a person who 
is of a sort to: reject aestheticism (the idea of 
art for art’s sake), endorse Marxism (Oppen 
in fact did), see immigrants as arriving to hor-
ror twice over – first urban poverty and then, 
more terribly, the “small lawns” of suburban 
life and hence of middle-class complicity – and 
to take little hope that art is winning the bat-
tle against the cultural and political forces it 
strives to transform.  
I confess a reliance here on critics better 
than myself, and some critics will of course 
disagree with one or another claim I have 
made about the lyric and just what it is giv-
ing voice to. But this isn’t a problem for my 
general point. For the philosopher concerned 
with selves, what is interesting about these dis-
agreements is that they each can be read as 
arguments about the standing values, commit-
ments, disappointments, and hopes implied by 
a voice inclined to utter lines such as these. In 
a word, they are claims about how the voice in 
the poem, given the manner in which express-
es itself, appears to hang together as a person: 
as a thinking, feeling, and valuing being. They 
are not quite descriptions of discrete (occur-
rent) mental states so much as statements of 
implied character.  
What is philosophically remarkable about 
poems such as this is that in them we see vir-
tually none of those features much philosophy 
of self tells us is necessary for constructing a 
sense of self. Oppen’s accomplishment here is 
to evaluate from the poem so much of what we 
take to be required to express a self-concept. 
It is an artistic exercise in reduction. We are 
given a handful of highly figurative lines that 
outline, if you will, the speaker’s field of per-
ceptual and affective attention. No facts of the 
speaker’s history are revealed, and indeed the 
poem never once uses a first-person pronoun. 
Nothing “narrativists” claim is essential to 
crafting a sense of self is happening here, clear-
ly. Yet in the absence of nearly all biographic 
detail, we see the bare form of person begin 
to take shape. The expressive content of the 
lines is perceptual and reflective, and these 
lines coalesce into the outline of perspective. 
We have the construction of an image of one 
who perceives, thinks, and feels in this way, and 
the poem shows us that this is one manner 
in which we outline what a person is. It is a 
person as a distinct perspective: as the site of a 
61
particular purchase on the world. That is one 
way of understanding what a self essentially is. 
Whatever notion of a self is implicated in this, 
I suspect the interest we can take in it is nearly 
always exhausted by the interest we can take 
in the presence of voice in the poem. If we find 
it odd to wonder how we experience a self in 
a poem, the queerness of the idea dissipates 
once we recast it in terms of the experience 
of a voice. And at this point the search for a 
real self to supply a soul for self-expression 
seems an uninteresting affair. Indeed, anyone 
who reads enough poetry will know, at times 
the voice of a lyric can be disembodied, or 
the voice of a culture, a nightmare, Kant’s 
transcendental subject, or whatever. We thus 
should very much be disinclined to be liter-
alists about the kind self implicated in poetry. 
It is a virtue of the lyrical model that it can 
accommodate this. And note that even when 
disembodied or harnessed to abstract objects, 
a voice can still have much to show us about 
how its bearer hangs together. We just would 
do well not to imagine it hanging together in 
an actual human body.  
The notion of voice, as I am using it here, 
is intended to highlight a very precise accom-
plishment: when our expressive acts are exem-
plary as acts of self-disclosure, what we say con-
veys not merely this feeling or that thought, 
this want or that experience, but, along with 
all this, a sense of how we are constituted as 
selves. Conceived lyrically, then, self-expres-
sion is not a matter of making public discrete 
thoughts and feelings we feel compelled to 
share. It is not that sense of expression at all. 
It is self-expression as a matter of speaking in 
such a way that general features of who we are 
brought to view through the particular things 
that we say. Our style of expression, and our 
manner of giving voice to the concerns that 
animate us, count for everything here. 
We do need to acknowledge that in our 
small achievements of voice, we do not there-
by achieve poetry; the poet’s voice must bear 
significant aesthetic fruit, and, sadly, we rarely 
live up to this. This problem also plagues the 
narrative view of the self, for if life is to be 
modelled on literary narratives, we run into 
the obvious problem that the narratives of 
most human lives, unlike those of most nov-
els, are not interesting, are usually poorly told, 
begin clumsily and end terribly, and lack, well, 
the literariness of literature. The same, pre-
sumably, with our voices and their attempts 
at self-expression. But the bullet to be bitten 
here is clear. The poet, like the novelist, is just 
an exemplum in our theories of selfhood, of-
fering ideals to which we only very imperfectly 
attain. What is important is that this literary 
model of the self, interpreted either novelis-
tically or poetically, can cast light on our own 
attempts to use words to shape a sense of self. 
In the novel or the poem, we see in a purer 
form the structure of certain acts of self-artic-
ulation. Life isn’t literature, but literature can, 
certainly on occasion, give us the exemplary 
instance. What I have done here is argue that 
the literary model of selfhood would do very 
well to consider also the poet when explaining 
how we make sense of, as the late Peter Goldie 
put it, the mess inside.
John Gibson is associate professor of philosophy at the 
University of Louisville. He is the author of Fiction 
and The Weave of Life (Oxford, 2007) and editor 
of The Philosophy of Poetry (Oxford, 2015).
62
A soul can be turned 
into art 
Thoughts
